

# Theories, Techniques and Tools for Engineering Heterogeneous Railway Networks

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RSSRail Conference '17

November 16th, Pistoia

Railway Signalling

Formal Methods for Railway

Developing Distributed Interlocking Model


Formal Verification of Hybrid (Event-B) Models

Conclusions and Future Work


# Railway Signalling

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- Low rolling resistance makes railway efficient for heavy load transportation.
- A train cannot be stopped at a short notice (spatial/temporal separation).
- Railway signalling (interlocking) ensures a safe railway operation.
  - Route-based fixed block signalling.
  - Route-based moving block signalling.



**Figure 1:** Route-based fixed block signalling. National Signalling Systems, European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 0 - 2.




**Figure 2:** Route-based moving block signalling. Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) System, ETCS Level 3.

# Railway Signalling - New Challenges

- Replacing national signalling systems.
- Integrating mainline services with urban networks.
  - Crossrail Network (ETCS, CBTC and TPWS).
  - Thameslink Network (ETCS and TPWS).
- RBC/RBC Handover.
- Trains transition at a line speed.

# Railway Signalling - New Challenges



**Figure 3:** Level Transition. RBC-RBC Handover, ETCS/CBTC Handover.



# Formal Methods for Railway

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- Railway data verification.
  - topology verification;
  - control table verification;
- Distributed nature of railway (larger railway networks).
  - Multiple interlocking communication;
- Cyber-physical nature of railway. ‘
  - Communication, computation and control aspects;
  - Discrete and continuous system behaviour;

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## PhD Objective.

*To develop a practical formal verification framework for reasoning about safety of (distributed-hybrid) heterogeneous railway networks.*

# Developing Distributed Interlocking Model

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# Generic Safe Railway Model

- A generic safe railway model.
- Automatic mathematical model extraction from the source data.
- Matching dataset against the assumptions of a formal model.
- Counter-example on a schema layout.

**System Requirement 1.** Cross boundary route locking and releasing system must ensure that a cross boundary route has been reserved only to a single train at a time.

**System Requirement 2.** Cross boundary route locking system must ensure that a locked cross boundary route has points properly positioned and signals sets.

**System Requirement 3.** Cross boundary route locking system must ensure that train will cross to the next interlocking zone only if connection with the following interlocking has been established.




# Extending Generic Safe Railway Model

- Event-B modelling to develop the theory of safe railway.
- Theory describes route locking and releasing mechanism.
  - Absence of collisions;
  - Derailment;
  - Protection of flanks;
- The proof of Event-B model is a one time effort.
- The model is automatically instantiated for a particular schema.
- The control table and topology of a concrete railway is safe if instantiated model is an instant of a generic.


Event-B model refinement plan.

1. Abstract model of processes capturing resources.
  - Global controller and a shared-resource problem.
  - Distributing controllers.
  - Introducing graph into the model.
2. Introducing railway related information.
  - Routes, lines, points, signals.
  - Route locking mechanism.
3. Including a hybrid part for level transition.


# Extending Generic Safe Railway Model - Abstract Model




# Extending Generic Safe Railway Model - Abstract Model



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# Formal Verification of Hybrid (Event-B) Models


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# Automated Theorem Proving and Cloud Technology

- In recent years a lot automated theorem provers were developed.
  - SMT based provers (e.g. Z3, CVC3)
  - Umbrella provers (e.g. Why3)
- Automated theorem proving is computationally intensive exercise.
- Cloud technology offers:
  - cheap computational power,
  - flexibility,
  - process parallelism.
- Reasoning about continuous behaviour is difficult (interactive).



# Automated Theorem Proving and Cloud Technology



## **Conclusions and Future Work**

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Practical outcomes.

- Safety invariants for cross boundary transition.
- Improved verification automation of hybrid models.

Future work.

- Hybrid framework.